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Problem area 
Aviation security concerns 
measures taken to counter acts of 
unlawful interference against civil 
aviation.The European Commission 
(EC) Project SAFEE (Security of 
Aircraft in the Future European 
Environment) aims to develop 
aircraft security systems designed to 
prevent and respond adequately to 
on-board threats. The main goal is 
to ensure a fully secure flight from 
departure to arrival destination 
whatever threats may occur. Among 
the key activities are the 
identification and analysis of in-
flight threats. The SAFEE approach 
is to proactively anticipate these 
threats and to focus the system 
development on countering the 
threats with the highest risk. 
 
Description of work 
This paper introduces SAFEE and 
its risk and threat assessment 
process. SAFEE aims to ensure a 
fully secured flight from departure 
to arrival destination. Security 
occurrences have been analyzed and 
a risk and threat assessment is 
performed. Based on the findings, 
the basic principles for the SAFEE 
operational concept and system 
architecture have been defined. 
Guidelines and recommendations 
for execution of an aviation risk and 
threat assessment have been given. 
 
Results and conclusions 
A comprehensive Risk Assessment 
Process (RAP) is the essential 
primary component of any security 
system. The identification and 
grading of the risks –according to 
their potential impact or potentiality 
– are essential for developing the 
best corresponding countermeasure 
and design. It was decided that the 
SAFEE RAP uses a qualitative 
approach, which is based on a 
relative assessment of the risks 
related to the SAFEE Operational 
Concept Description with the 
current situation. Aviation security 
databases have been explored to 
come up with a first assessment of 
the risk of each of eleven defined 
SAFEE in-flight threat scenarios to 
occur. Two databases were used: 
the air transport security database of 
NLR (with 20000 occurrences) and 
the aviation terror database of GS-3. 
 
Applicability 
The Risk Assessment Process is 
used to evaluate the SAFEE system 
design. The SAFEE participants are 
active in the EUROCAE Working 
Group 72 ‘Aeronautical Systems 
Security’ towards a Handbook for 
Civil Airborne Systems Security 
Assessment. The co-operation with 
the EUROCONTROL ATM 
Security Domain is acknowledged. 
 
This report is based on a presentation held at the 25th International Congress of the Aeronautical Sciences (ICAS 2006), 
Hamburg (Germany), 3-8 September 2006. 
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Summary 
Aviation security concerns measures taken to counter acts of unlawful interference against civil 
aviation. The European Commission (EC) Project SAFEE (Security of Aircraft in the Future 
European Environment) aims to develop aircraft security systems designed to prevent and 
respond adequately to on-board threats [1, 2]. The main goal is to ensure a fully secure flight 
from departure to arrival destination whatever threats may occur. Among the key activities are 
the identification and analysis of in-flight threats. The SAFEE approach is to proactively 
anticipate these threats and to focus the system development on countering the threats with the 
highest risk. For this purpose, security occurrences are analyzed and a risk and threat assessment 
is performed. Based on the findings, the basic principles for the SAFEE operational concept and 
system architecture are defined. This paper introduces SAFEE and its risk and threat assessment 
process. Guidelines and recommendations for the execution of an aviation risk and threat 
assessment are given. 
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1 Introduction 
Aviation security concerns measures taken to counter acts of unlawful interference against civil 
aviation. Since the events of September 11
th
, the aviation community has strengthened security, 
so as to counteract threats to air transport. In aviation, where the responsibilities and tasks are 
divided between several actors, implementing new security systems and procedures in a safe 
and secure way is not always easy, and depends strongly on adequate response and 
communication procedures.  
 
The 11th September event has shown that, by subduing the crew and passengers, hijackers can 
take control of a civil aircraft and use it as a guided weapon. The immediate drop in passengers 
following September 11th showed that public confidence in air transport was severely eroded for 
a significant period of time. A first set of urgency measures were taken by authorities (e.g. 
EUROCONTROL, ICAO, European Commission, ECAC, FAA/TSA) to increase security, both 
in airports and on-board aircraft. However, analysis of the security measures demonstrated that 
little was done onboard (the main focus was on cockpit door reinforcement, better training of 
cabin crew, and sky marshals on board more flights). Hence, there might be a need to further 
increase onboard security. It is clear that a fresh approach needs to be adopted; an approach 
which will utilize new technologies in order to achieve the goal: create a safe, none burdening to 
the customer and economical security system which fully restores confidence of the air 
passengers.  
 
SAFEE aims to develop advanced aircraft security systems designed to prevent and respond 
adequately to in-flight threats. The main goal is to ensure a fully secured flight from departure 
to arrival destination. This is done through implementation of on-board threat detection systems 
and the provision of reliable threat information to the flight crew. In the decision making and 
response management process, air/ground exchange of threat level information (e.g. down-
linking of aircraft voice/video information) is foreseen. 
 
The SAFEE approach is that waiting for new types of threats and incidents to occur and then 
improve security is not the right way forward. The aim shall be to proactively anticipate threats 
and to focus the system development on countering those threats with the highest risk. In order 
to identify threats, and the risks resulting from those threats, we need to develop a tailor made, 
security oriented, Risk Assessment methodology and Process (RAP) for SAFEE, and to 
confront the challenges derived from this assignment: to identify the relevant targets and assets, 
to assess relevant threats, to identify vulnerabilities and loop holes, and to present potential 
consequences to the decision makers.  
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The events of September 11 have flagged the need to consider security oriented risk assessment 
as part of every overall system design and analysis. Historically, system and concept developers 
avoided explicit modeling of security risks because of challenges inherent in this effort, such as 
identifying relevant targets and threats; modeling threat, vulnerability, and consequence for a 
scenario; and presenting this information to regulators for decision making.  
 
Over the years, risk assessments were focused on accident risks, natural hazard risks, business 
interruption risks, project risks, and financial risks. In these areas, those assessments were based 
on systematic processes and tools to understand and prioritize risks (especially those with 
catastrophic consequences) so that decision makers will be able to apply their resources to best 
use. However, the area of security risk did not receive its well deserved attention.  
 
The distinction between security oriented risk assessments and safety oriented methodologies 
for risk assessment is needed due to the different nature of the risk element. Safety related 
incidents/ accidents are un-intentional occurrences, while security related occurrences often are 
intentional acts of unlawful interference where perpetrators are constantly seeking to exploit the 
vulnerabilities of the air transportation system to perform a certain threat scenario. In security 
related risk assessment, the vulnerability element is therefore to be included via a metric of the 
likelihood that various types of safeguarding against a scenario will fail.  
 
Security assessments are commonly based upon analysis of Possible Modes of Hostile action 
scenarios (PMHAs), relying mainly on intelligence-based information, analysis of past events 
and activating "red teams" activities, trying to defeat the current security systems and 
procedures. Security assessments are then utilized into the security systems, by using a layered 
approach to security, also referred to as the "Security Circles" concept. After identification of a 
new PMHA (by intelligence or other means), the findings are immediately translated into new 
security countermeasures. Countermeasures are applied in a general manner, such that all threats 
receive the same level of importance (with no respect to threat impact and/or potentiality).  
In this paper, we introduce a new security oriented risk assessment process, which might be 
used by regulatory authorities and decision makers to decide on the safe and secure introduction 
of new security systems/concepts. Section 2 presents some initiatives to improve air transport 
security, including the SAFEE concept. Section 3 describes the use of security incident/accident 
data to derive threat scenarios to be countered. Section 4 presents the SAFEE Risk Assessment 
Process (RAP). Section 5 contains the conclusions and recommendations. 
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2 Aviation security systems and procedures 
2.1 International context  
Aviation security procedures are well founded in international and national regulations, laws 
and procedures since at least the early 70s [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. However, the ‘9/11’ hijackings have 
shown that it is not always possible to prevent the occurrence of extremely severe events. This 
has led to adaptations of the aviation security standards, recommended practices and 
regulations, and has increased security research and development. The two main European 
aviation security research programs are SAFEE [1, 2] and ERRIDS [9, 10]. Whereas SAFEE 
focuses on the construction of an aircraft decision support system, the EUROCONTROL driven 
ERRIDS (European Regional Renegade Information Dissemination System) focuses on 
exchange of threat and incident information between ground organizations involved in handling 
renegades.  
 
The responsibilities with respect to in-flight security decision making are quite complex as, 
depending on threat level, different international and national organizations are involved in 
handling on-board threats. Responsibilities will also usually change as the threat level increases 
and in the case of very severe events (such as a hijacked aircraft being used as a guided missile) 
even military forces might become involved. This implies that it is not easy to fully oversee the 
impact and consequences of the introduction of new and advanced in-flight security measures 
on flight safety or the organizations itself.  
 
Four threat levels of passenger disturbances were established by ICAO as definition, as to what 
is occurring on the aircraft [3]:  
• Level 1 Disruptive behaviour,  
• Level 2 Physically abusive behavior,  
• Level 3 Life threatening behaviour, and  
• Level 4 Attempted breach or actual breach of the flight crew compartment.  
 
The overall target of any security system is to make the critical assets fully protected against 
anything that can inflict danger, damage, or threat to the asset or to its users. In air transport 
security, the wish could be to make the flight 100 % secure; when faced with reality, one must 
recognize that this will be very difficult to realize. Today, crews might need to use any means 
available up to and including deadly force, to e.g. prevent hijackers from gaining control over 
the aircraft. In case an aircraft is hijacked and used as a guided missile, military fighters are 
often expected to intercept the aircraft and ultimately shoot it down. 
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2.2 SAFEE Operational Concept & Systems  
In Figure 1 the ATM security environment and the main threats to it are depicted. On-board 
threats include hijacking, sabotage of the aircraft systems, bringing explosives on-board, use of 
biological and chemical agents, hampering of the flight controls. Not all these threats are easily 
detected with the current state of security systems. As long as certain threats can't be detected by 
the ground security and certainly not on board, there is a high potentiality of a successful attack. 
In the wake of the September 11th
  
terrorist attacks, several technologies have been developed 
and new procedures have been implemented to improve the security in the air transportation 
system.  
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Figure 1 Overview of ATM Security Scope 
 
Depending on the threat level, different security procedures for on-board actors apply. The 
SAFEE Operational Concept is in line with this, and anticipates security support for:  
• Pilots – will have a modified cockpit and new equipment available for use when a threat 
occurs. After an attack emergency procedures will be applied.  
• Cabin Crew – might be the first to detect acts of unlawful interference. Trained cabin crew, 
supported by passenger and cargo information, might be able to prevent escalation of low 
level threats into more severe incidents.  
• Sky marshal – is well trained to respond to severe on-board threats, and to decide (together 
with the pilots) how to react in the first minutes of an attack. SAFEE also considers the 
possibility that there is no sky marshal on board.  
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The following functionalities are foreseen:  
• On-board Threat Detection System (OTDS), with three functionalities:  
o Dangerous Objects Detection (DODF),  
o Suspicious Behavior Detection Function (SBDF),  
o Access Control and Registration (ACRF).  
• Threat Assessment and Response Management System (TARMS).  
• Emergency Avoidance System (EAS).  
• Flight Reconfiguration Function (FRF).  
• Anti Threat Data Link (ATDL).  
• Electromagnetic Threat Detection System (ETDS).  
• Secured voice and data communications.  
• Secured open world (internet on-board).  
• Authentication of pilot/crew commands.  
 
A graphical representation of the whole SAFEE system, including the interfaces between the 
SAFEE systems, is shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2 SAFEE on-board systems and data-flows 
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The SAFEE systems output comprises:  
• Alert / information to the cockpit crew;  
• Alert / information to the cabin crew;  
• Alert / information to security staff;  
• Commands to the aircraft systems;  
• Information to ground when necessary. 
 
SAFEE systems input includes:  
• Pre-flight data: passenger data, luggage data, cargo data, threat level data.  
• Pre-flight Terrain, Obstacles, Prohibited for Security Areas (PSA) data.  
• In-flight data: OTDS alerts, crew input, aircraft systems input (e.g. position), sensor data, 
updates of pre-flight data.  
• Input from ground network systems (ERRIDS).  
• Potential collision alerts (from EAS).  
 
The SAFEE system has interfaces for the pilot (in the cockpit), cabin crew and security staff (in 
the cabin), on-board crew communication links, and air/ground communication links [16].  
 
It is also possible that on-ground security staff may obtain real-time access individual sensor 
output through a data-link connection (ACARS or VDL). The foreseen air/ground data-link with 
the ERRIDS will be the main (secured) channel/gateway for uplink and downlink of threat 
information from the ground to the aircraft and vice versa. Information on the status of control 
of the aircraft and its predicted flight path is essential to the national authorities and other 
decision makers.  
 
In order to better assess the current status of air transport security and the future situation when 
SAFEE is used, the impact and potentiality of on-board threats shall be defined and assessed 
through a risk, vulnerability and threat assessment. Traditionally, such assessment is often based 
upon answering the following four questions:  
• Why does the attacker want to perform certain Modes of Hostile Action (MHA)?  
• Why use the MHA against a certain target or asset?  
• If attacked, what might be the impact of the attack? How critical is the asset?  
• What is the potentiality of the attack to succeed? What is the likelihood of the 
countermeasures to deny the attack?  
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3 Analysis of aviation security occurrences  
A wide range of aviation security incidents and accidents have occurred in the past, both during 
the flight and at the airport. An aviation security database helps to come up with a first 
assessment, based on incidents and accidents that occurred in the past, of the risk of threats 
occurring. Different security occurrences have been identified and analyzed:  
• Terror/criminal acts – e.g. explosions, hijacks, and sabotage either in flight or at the 
airport.  
• Unruly passenger behavior – disruptive or physically abusive behavior, and attempted 
breach of the cockpit door.  
• Security breaches – the use of forbidden items in the cabin (found in baggage during 
security checks on the airport), people entering a forbidden airport area.  
 
The NLR Air Transport Security database contains security occurrences (e.g. hijacking, 
sabotage, unruly passengers, military action) [11, 12, 13]. Data sources are: official ICAO 
reporting systems, insurance claims, regulator data, airline reporting systems, TSA data, Air 
Watch, and data from a security company. Athena GS-3 has selected, from its vast security 
database, the most relevant onboard terror incidents based upon the following sources: National 
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), International Policy Institute for 
Counter Terrorism (ICT), Air safe web site; and information from open sources (e.g. internet), 
using special search tools dedicated for anti terror purposes. These data sources use different 
classifications for security occurrences and also describe these occurrences with different levels 
of detail. Interesting is the apparent lack of statistical trends over the years (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3 Example number of major occurrences [12] 
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The aviation security databases have been used to identify and analyze threats related to current 
practice flight operations. One of the outcomes is a list of threat scenarios that have been used 
by terrorists to invade through the security systems, exploiting the vulnerabilities inherent in 
those systems. After assembling this threat scenarios list, it has been 'tested' against a variety of 
examples of security occurrences and information gathered through brainstorm sessions with 
security experts and operational experts. It appears that a full list of in-flight security 
occurrences can be related to one (or more) of eleven identified scenarios which are used within 
the threat assessment process (for confidentiality reasons it is not possible to describe these 
scenarios in detail in this paper). 
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4 Risk assessment process 
4.1 Concept of building a validation case  
The concept of Validation Case Building is well embedded in the European Operational 
Concept Validation Methodology (E-OCVM) for providing the argument for introduction of 
ATM systems/concepts [19]. Since 2005, EOCVM is required to be used in all new EC and 
Eurocontrol projects dealing with validation of ATM systems. It requires construction of a 
Safety Case, Business Case and Human Factors case. In this context, EUROCONTROL has 
recently also started the development of a Security Case Methodology [10]. Such analysis 
considers:  
• Security impact of bringing a new security system/concept into operation.  
• Decommissioning of existing systems which will be replaced.  
• Staff training, clearance level and qualification.  
• Abnormal modes of operation.  
• How to validate all the assumptions.  
 
A Security Case will proof the security concept of a new system/concept against security 
objectives and targets. As such it will deal with the outcome of the threat assessment and 
vulnerability analysis of a new system/concept, in line of defense for security against all 
potential attacks (threat scenarios). The aim is to provide answers to the questions:  
• What is being assessed?  
• How secure should it be?  
• Is the design secure?  
• Is the implementation secure?  
 
An important part of building such Security Case is the execution of a threat assessment. In 
principle, there are two ways to support the introduction of new security systems, namely by 
showing that the risk of threats to occur:  
• does not increase with the introduction of the proposed security system/concept (a relative 
assessment);  
• does not exceed some pre-defined risk requirement (an absolute assessment). 
 
4.2 Risk and threat assessment principles  
The first step in preventing or minimizing the damage caused by terror attacks is assessment of 
the risks to the security system. It provides the foundation for selection and implementation of 
countermeasures to reduce the risk associated with existing or new threats.  
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Assessing threats requires a different approach than other risks: terrorist attacks and sabotage 
events do not follow a ‘natural’ or ‘predictable’ pattern, and thus shall be dealt with in another 
way than safety related incidents/accidents. Traditionally, risks are measured as function of 
event frequency and probability that all safeguards fail. However, to assess the risk of a security 
occurrence, we have to address threat (posed by the attacker) and vulnerability (lack of 
safeguarding of a system against threats).  
 
In order to come up with the new SAFEE risk assessment methodology, several systematic risk 
assessment methodologies, utilized by Airbus, NLR and GS-3 (all members of the SAFEE 
Consortium) have been analyzed [11, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Material from Eurocontrol and ICAO [4, 
5, 9, 10] has also been analyzed, because SAFEE aims to be consistent with regulatory 
requirements and best practices. The diagram1 represents a relationship between Risk, 
Vulnerability, Threat and Assets; the concepts upon which the SAFEE risk assessment 
methodology has been built. 
 
Figure 4 Security concepts and risk relationships [14] 
 
The risk of loss of an asset is linked to vulnerabilities it possesses, which are exploited by 
threats. The assessment consists of defining assets, determining vulnerabilities and threats, so 
that we are able to assess the risk (i.e. threat) level. Countermeasures may be specified to lower 
the risk, and will be expressed in the form of Security Design Objectives. Note that threats 
considered as such are malevolent actions (aggressions). This differs from the Mehari model 
[14], where threats of misuse or dysfunction are also considered. 
 
                                                     
1 Common Criteria, Chapter 4 from Part 1 [14] 
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4.3 Risk Assessment Methodology  
The SAFEE risk assessment methodology is used for assessment of the risk related to in-flight 
threats, and consists of 4 consecutive phases comprising fourteen tasks (Figure 5).  
 
The risk assessment aims to identify potential threats, to determine timely means to safeguard 
against these threats, and to prioritize them according to a risk level. The outcome of a threat 
assessment shall always be accompanied by a proof that safety is not jeopardized.  
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Figure 5 Four phases of risk assessment [11] 
 
The goal of the preparation phase is to understand the ‘problem’, i.e. to sketch the operation 
and its security environment, to explain the (user’s) need for performing the operation, and to 
determine a way to investigate the problem. The preparation phase identifies assets and 
vulnerabilities to be protected and provides a sufficient description of the operational 
environment of these assets. 
 
Threat
Threat
= Vulnerability
Asset
 
 
Figure 6 Assets, vulnerabilities and threats [11] 
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Threats existing in the operational environment need to be identified and understood. This is 
done in the identification phase. The individual threats are structured into threat scenarios. A 
scenario is defined as a sequence of modes and events leading to a security occurrence (a 
security-related accident or incident). Modes indicate states of for instance systems, human 
operators, or the aircraft; events signify changes between these modes.  
 
The purpose of the analysis phase is to estimate the risks associated with the threat scenarios. 
As risk is characterized as the combination of the severity of the outcome of an event and its 
likelihood of occurrence, the impact and potentiality of the threat scenarios needs to be assessed 
and evaluated.  
 
Finally, conclusion and recommendations need to be drawn from the risks as evaluated in the 
analysis phase. Here, it will be necessary to understand the risks and to translate them into 
security objectives or requirements for the operational environment. When it is determined that 
risk levels are (too) high, countermeasures will need to be defined that reduce either the impact 
of the consequence of a threat, or the potentiality of its occurrence. 
 
4.4 Risk Level Determination  
The purpose of the analysis phase is to determine the risk levels associated to the threat 
scenarios. Risk is defined as the combination of the gravity of an event, and the likelihood of its 
occurrence. The gravity of a threat scenario is expressed by the impact of the consequences of 
the scenario. The likelihood of a threat scenario is expressed by the potentiality of its 
consequences. Several aspects appear relevant when estimating the potentiality of a scenario, for 
instance:  
• The level of skills and knowledge required by the perpetrators.  
• The availability of required means, such as weapons and electronic devices.  
• The opportunity that the security environment offers to place the attack.  
• The expected potential gains, for instance in money or media attention.  
• The chance to be caught and punished.  
 
Initial impact and potentiality metrics for classification of a threat scenario are given in 
Appendix A. The consequences of a threat scenario must be assessed according to all metrics, 
i.e. a total of 15 metric items will need to be assessed through use of expert opinion, incident/ 
accident data analysis and/or intelligence. Note that the potentiality class has been split into two 
separate classes, based on the motivation and possibility for an attack.  
 
After this classification process, which involves assessment of all the consequences for all 
metric items, the threat scenarios are ranked according to the impact and potentiality results. In 
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this ranking process, the scenarios with high attack motivation and high attack possibility are 
ranked with the highest potentiality. Since different estimated effects will be applicable to a 
threat scenario, mathematics might be used to translate the impact metrics and potentiality 
metrics into one impact ranking and one potentiality ranking.  
 
When impact and potentiality rankings for the threat scenarios have been determined, the risk 
level of the security occurrences follows from a risk level matrix (see Table 1). Such matrix is 
based on the notion that security occurrences with a large impact should have a low potentiality, 
and consequences with a high potentiality should have little impact. 
 
Table 1: SAFEE risk level matrix (proposed) 
Impact 
Potentiality  
Strong 
(4) 
Medium 
(3) 
Weak 
(2) 
No impact 
(1) 
Probable (A)  4A 3A 2A 1A 
Possible (B)  4B 3B 2B 1B 
Unlikely (C)  4C 3C 2C 1C 
 
Acceptability of threats and risk is a sensitive issue, which needs to be decided through a 
political process rather than in engineering. The proposed risk level table will therefore need to 
be backed up by regulators. Security system and/or operational objectives and requirements are 
to be established if the risk level is higher than deemed acceptable.  
 
4.5 Security objectives and requirements  
It might be necessary to define countermeasures that reduce either severity of the consequence 
of an individual threat, or the likelihood of its occurrence. The security objectives should be 
consistent with the stated operational aim or product purpose of the system, and any knowledge 
about its physical environment. The need for defining a set of security objectives was already 
recognized by regulatory entities in the wake of the 9/11 events. ICAO has made amendments 
to Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention, which identify additional areas of concern, clarify 
aviation security objectives in a changing environment, and recommend changes to authority 
delegation, information sharing and response mechanisms. EUROCONTROL suggests that, as 
part of the security case, a set of security objectives must be developed against which a new 
security system will be assessed. The security objectives are based upon the consequences that 
can be accepted by the regulators, the security experts, and the public. 
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The purpose of determining security objectives is to address all of the security concerns and to 
declare which security aspects are either addressed directly by the system or by its environment. 
This categorization is based on a process incorporating database research, overall security 
policy, risk assessment and risk level acceptance decisions. Security objectives are needed for 
two reasons:  
• Enforce security policies – once approved, security objectives may serve as leverage to 
enforce the security policy due to the fact that the security objectives were determined as a 
result of prior analyses.  
• Counter risks – the main objective of security systems is to counter risks, and the best way 
of checking that the system meets its objectives, is to check it against predetermined 
objectives.  
 
Security objectives aim at either protecting the asset before an attack (e.g. deterrent or 
preventive measures), or by reducing the effect of an attack after it has arose (e.g. protective, 
palliative or recovery measures). In order to produce security objectives, experts should review 
the newly proposed security system together with the assessed risk level (the outcome of the 
threat assessment) and define a qualitative scale for definition of the objective.  
E.g. because hijacking was ranked as bearing a high risk, reinforced cockpit doors accompanied 
with tight security procedures were introduced. The security objective for this could be that the 
number of times the door is opened not in accordance with the security procedures should be 
zero. A similar objective could be derived from a requirements demand that the cockpit door 
must be locked from the time the cabin doors were closed until they are open again. The 
security objective then can be that every time the door is opened during flight, possible hijack 
countermeasures are implemented fully. Every time the door was opened and the 
countermeasures were not enforced by the crew, it will be reported as a failure of the security 
system. 
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5 Conclusions and recommendations  
This paper introduces SAFEE and its risk and threat assessment process. SAFEE aims to ensure 
a fully secured flight from departure to arrival destination. The SAFEE approach is to 
proactively anticipate in-flight threats and to focus the system development on countering 
threats with the highest risk. For this purpose, security occurrences have been analyzed and a 
risk and threat assessment is performed. Based on the findings, the basic principles for the 
SAFEE operational concept and system architecture have been defined. Guidelines and 
recommendations for execution of an aviation risk and threat assessment have been given.  
 
Risk Assessment Process (RAP)  
A comprehensive Risk Assessment Process is the essential primary component of any security 
system. The identification and grading of the risks –according to their potential impact or 
potentiality – are essential for developing the best corresponding countermeasure and design. 
During this study, it was decided that the SAFEE RAP uses a qualitative approach, which is 
based on a relative assessment of the risks related to the SAFEE Operational Concept 
Description with the current situation. 
 
It is important that the decisions upon acceptable/unacceptable risk level are taken by the 
regulators and are not changed during the risk assessment itself. The regulators might use 
conclusions and recommendations of the security experts to adapt the aviation security 
requirements and objectives, when it appears to be necessary – there will be more information to 
use at the end of the process. Even the lowest risk, as long it poses some level of risk, must be 
considered and carefully analyzed. In this decision making process one should realize that flight 
safety must not be jeopardized by introduction of new security procedures. 
 
Security incident/accident analysis 
Aviation security databases have been explored to come up with a first assessment of the risk of 
each of eleven defined SAFEE in-flight threat scenarios to occur. Two databases were used: the 
air transport security database of NLR (with 20000 occurrences) and the aviation terror database 
of GS-3. Past occurrences are often used to stimulate the security effort and not as only source 
for evaluating the threat potential.  
 
The role of intelligence 
As terrorists are constantly developing new and improved abilities and Modes of Hostile 
Action, in addition to analyzing and utilizing aviation security data, it is important to include the 
use of intelligence-based information and/or opinion gathered from security experts.  
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Further work and co-operation 
The SAFEE team uses the Risk Assessment Process (RAP) to evaluate the SAFEE system 
design. SAFEE participants are working in the EUROCAE Working Group 72 ‘Aeronautical 
Systems Security’ towards a Handbook for Civil Airborne Systems Security Assessment. The 
authors also acknowledge the co-operation of SAFEE with the EUROCONTROL ATM 
Security Domain, which is responsible for the ERRIDS. 
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Appendix A Initial impact and potentiality metrics 
 
 Potentiality level 
Risk factor 
Probable 
(A) 
Possible 
(B) 
 Unlikely  
(C) 
 Possibility  
Required skills No special skills required  Requires some 
Knowledge or skills 
Requires expert knowledge or 
skills 
Required means No special means required 
or the required means are 
easy to obtain  
Required means can be 
made available with 
difficulty  
Required means are difficult to 
obtain and/or to apply 
effectiveness of the existing 
security countermeasures 
Security countermeasures 
are not effective or ill-fitting 
the threat 
Security countermeasures 
are limited or have low level 
of effect iveness on the threat
Security countermeasures are 
very effective on the specific  
threat  
Defender's current 
intelligence information 
No informat ion about 
intention to attack 
General informat ion with no 
specific target  
Specific informat ion about time 
and place of attack 
Time opportunity Attack can be placed 
(almost) at any moment in 
time; time does not play a 
role in the attack 
Time plays some ro le in the 
attack  
Time plays a crucial ro le; a 
successful attack can only be 
placed at a few moments in 
time 
 Motivation level 
Financial profit fo r each 
one of the different parties 
involved: 
− The planner 
− The attacker or his 
family 
− The collaborator 
All the parties involved or at 
least one of the parties 
involved will receive a large 
sum of money (above ten 
thousands dollars) 
All the parties involved or at 
least one of the parties 
involved will receive only a 
fair sum of money (few 
thousands of dollars) 
All the part ies involved or at 
least one of the parties involved 
will receive negligible sum or 
no money at all (few hundreds 
of dollars) 
Receiv ing Media attention 
and coverage  
World coverage with vast 
attention  
Regional coverage and fair 
attention  
Very small coverage and 
attention  
Glorificat ion of the attacker 
or organizat ion by : 
The people which the 
attack was directed at. 
The attacker's supporting 
environment The attacker's 
followers  
Receiv ing world wide 
recognition as being very 
courageous and fearless 
Limited recognition as being 
very courageous and 
fearless 
no change in recognition 
Impunity of the attack's 
planner 
Small chance of being 
caught  
Fair chance of being caught High chance of being caught 
Impunity of the attacker  Small chance of being 
caught 
Fair chance of being caught High chance of being caught 
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 Impact class 
Effect on … 
Strong 
(4) 
Medium 
(3) 
Weak 
(2) 
No impact
(1) 
Human life Multiple Fatalities Few fatalities 
 
Minor in juries No effect 
Aircraft and 
infrastructure  
Loss of aircraft 
Damage to infrastructure on the 
ground 
Aircraft unusable for 
limited t ime 
 
Minor damage No effect 
Air traffic control and 
overall security  
operation  
Transportation impossible for a  
significant time and/or in a large 
region  
Disorganisation of ground services
New developments and major 
changes of security 
countermeasures and operation 
Re-routing of some 
aircraft 
Flight interrupt 
Limited security 
upgrade and 
operational 
improvement 
Slight delays in flight 
schedules 
Minor changes in the 
security operation 
No effect 
Global – political 
and/or economical 
and/or military  
tension  
Dramat ic political change and/or 
full military campaign and/or 
dramat ic economical drop  
Long-term Political 
pressure and/or 
Limited Military  
operation and/ or 
Long-term economical 
change  
Short-term or minor 
political pressure 
and/or minor military 
movements and/or 
short-term 
economical change 
No effect 
Public confidence in  
aviation  
Dramat ic and extensive loss of 
confidence in air traffic 
Long term loss of 
confidence in air 
traffic 
Short term loss of 
confidence in air 
traffic 
No effect 
  
 
 
 
 
 
